I like big technological projects.. That's why from the point of view of a technologist, I consider Eisenhower to be the most based president.
Take a look at some of the projects that were started during his administration:
- NASA
- ARPA
- Interstate Highway System
- Project Orion
- ICBMs
- U2/SR-71
This post is in essence a recollection of facts on some of these projects, trying to recreate that zeitgeist.
His memorandum from 1946 to the generals is a good start as it encompasses the core of his philosophy - it proposes fusion of industry, science and the military and to me it is the apotheosis of basedness. For this reason, I will quote it in full.
Memorandum for Directors and Chiefs of War Department, General and Special Staff Divisions and Bureaus and the Commanding Generals of the Major Commands
Subject: Scientific and Technological Resources as Military Assets.
The recent conflict has demonstrated more convincingly than ever before the strength our nation can best derive from the integration of all of our national resources in time of war. It is of the utmost importance that the lessons of this experience be not forgotten in the peacetime planning and training of the Army. The future security of the nation demands that all those civilian resources which by conversion or redirection constitute our main support in time of emergency be associated closely with the activities of the Army in time of peace.
The lessons of the last war are clear. The military effort required for victory threw upon the Army an unprecedented range of responsibilities, many of which were effectively discharged only through the invaluable assistance supplied by our cumulative resources in the natural and social sciences and the talents and experience furnished by management and labor. The armed forces could not have won the war alone. Scientists and business men contributed techniques and weapons which enabled us to outwit and overwhelm the enemy. Their understanding of the Army's needs made possible the highest degree of cooperation. This pattern of integration must be translated into a peacetime counterpart which will not merely familiarize the Army with the progress made in science and industry, but draw into our planning for national security all the civilian resources which can contribute to the defense of the country.
Success in this enterprise depends to a large degree on the cooperation which the nation as a whole is willing to contribute. However, the Army as one of the main agencies responsible for the defense of the nation has the duty to take the initiative in promoting closer relations between civilian and military interests It must establish definite policies and administrative leadership which will make possible even greater contributions from science, technology, and management than during the last war.
In order to ensure the full use of our national resources in case of emergency, the following general policies will be put into effect:
(1) The Army must have civilian assistance in military planning as well as for the production of weapons. Effective long-range military planning can be done only in the light of predicted developments in science and technology. As further scientific achievements accelerate the tempo and expand the area of our operations, this interrelationship will become of even greater importance. In the past we have often deprived ourselves of vital help by limiting our use of scientific and technological resources to contracts for equipment. More often than not we can find much of the talent we need for comprehensive planning in industry or universities. Proper employment of this talent requires that the civilian agency shall have the benefit of our estimates of future military problems and shall work closely with Plans and the Research and Development authorities. A most effective procedure is the letting of contracts for aid in planning. The use of such a procedure will greatly enhance the validity of our planning as well as ensure sounder strategic equipment programs.
(2) Scientists and industrialists must be given the greatest possible freedom to carry out their research. The fullest utilization by the Army of the civilian resources of the nation cannot be procured merely by prescribing the military characteristics and requirements of certain types of equipment Scientists and industrialists are more likely to make new and unsuspected contributions to the development of the Army if detailed directions are held to a minimum. The solicitation of assistance under these conditions would not only make available to the Army talents and experience otherwise beyond our reach, but also establish mutual confidence between ourselves and civilians. It would familiarize them with our fundamental problems and strengthen greatly the foundation upon which our national security depends.
(3) The possibility of utilizing some of our industrial and technological resources as organic parts of our military structure in time of emergency should be carefully examined. The degree of cooperation with science and industry achieved during the recent war should by no means be considered the ultimate. There appears little reason for duplicating within the Army an outside organization which by its experience is better qualified than we are to carry out some of our tasks. The advantages to our nation in economy and to the Army in efficiency are compelling reasons for this procedure.
(4) Within the Army we must separate responsibility for research and development from the functions of procurement purchase, storage, and distribution. Our experience during the war and the experience of industry in time of peace indicate the need for such a policy. The inevitable gap between the scientist or technologist and the user can be bridged, as during the last war, by field experimentation with equipment still in the developmental stage. For example restricted-visibility operations with the aid of radar, such as blind bombing and control of tactical air, were made possible largely by bringing together technologists who knew the potentialities of the equipment and field commanders familiar with combat conditions and needs. Future cooperation of this type requires that research and development groups have authority to procure experimental items for similar tests.
(5) Officers of all arms and services must become fully aware of the advantages which the Army can derive from the close integration of civilian talent with military plans and developments. This end cannot be achieved merely by sending officers to universities for professional training. It is true that the Army's need for officers well trained in the natural and social sciences requires a thorough program of advanced study for selected military personnel, but in addition we must supply inducements which will encourage these men in the continued practical application of scientific and technological thought to military problems. A premium must be placed on professional attainments in the natural and social sciences as well as other branches of military science. Officers in each arm and service must familiarize themselves as much as possible with progress and plans made in other branches. Only then can the Army obtain the administrative and operative talents essential to its task and mutual understanding by the arms and services of their respective problems.
In general, the more we can achieve the objectives indicated above with respect to the cultivation, support and direct use of outside resources, the more energy will we have left to devote to strictly military problems for which there are no outside facilities or which for special security reasons can only be handled by the military. In fact, it is our responsibility deliberately to examine all outside resources as to adequacy, diversity, and geographical distribution and to ensure their full utilization as factors of security. It is our job to take the initiative to promote the development of new resources, if our national security indicates the need. It is our duty to support broad research programs in educational institutions, in industry, and in whatever field might be of importance to the Army. Close integration of military and civilian resources will not only directly benefit the Army, but indirectly contribute to the nation's security, as civilians are prepared for their role in an emergency by the experience gained in time of peace. The association of military and civilians in educational institutions and industry will level barriers, engender mutual understanding, and lead to the cultivation of friendships invaluable for future cooperation. The realization of our objectives places upon us, the military, the challenge to make our professional officers the equals in knowledge and training of civilians in similar fields and make our professional environment as inviting as those outside.
In the interest of cultivating to the utmost the integration of civilian and military resources and of securing the most effective unified direction of our research and development activities, this responsibility is being consolidated in a separate section on the highest War Department level. The Director of this section will be directly supported by one or more civilians, thus ensuring full confidence of both the military and the civilian in this undertaking. By the rotation of civilian specialists in this capacity we should have the benefit of broad guidance and should be able to furnish science and industry with a firsthand understanding of our problems and objectives. By developing the general policies outlined above under the leadership of the Director of Research and Development the Army will demonstrate the value it places upon science and technology and further the integration of civilian and military resources.
Signed by General Eisenhower
on April 27, 1946.
On ICBMs:
On 13 September 1955, President Dwight Eisenhower gave the ICBM program the highest national priority, and Schriever was promoted to major general in December. The number of scientists and engineers working on Atlas rose from 50 in 1955 to 800 in 1956 and 2,000 in 1957. Schriever instituted a system of monthly meetings known as "Black Saturdays". WDD and Ramo-Wooldridge staff would review the project progress, identify problems and assign responsibility for dealing with them. He initially resisted providing cost estimates, but was eventually obliged to do so in November 1956 as project costs rose above the allocated funding. The 1956 budget was $326 million.
In addition to the work on Atlas, the Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott, authorized a second ICBM project, which became Titan. To avoid conflict with Atlas, all the principal contractors were different. There also arose a requirement for an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which became known as Thor. The British government was interested in this kind of missile, but there still were restrictions on exchanging restricted data with the UK. The Air Staff was concerned about potential competition from the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. On 8 November 1955, Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson ordered both the Army and USAF to proceed with the development of an IRBM, with a priority equal to that of the ICBM but without interfering with it. Thus, Schriever became responsible for three different missile projects. A fourth was added in 1957: Minuteman, a solid-fuel rocket that promised to make the liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan obsolete.[In addition to the work on Atlas, the Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott, authorized a second ICBM project, which became Titan. To avoid conflict with Atlas, all the principal contractors were different. There also arose a requirement for an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), which became known as Thor. The British government was interested in this kind of missile, but there still were restrictions on exchanging restricted data with the UK. The Air Staff was concerned about potential competition from the Army Ballistic Missile Agency. On 8 November 1955, Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson ordered both the Army and USAF to proceed with the development of an IRBM, with a priority equal to that of the ICBM but without interfering with it. Thus, Schriever became responsible for three different missile projects. A fourth was added in 1957: Minuteman, a solid-fuel rocket that promised to make the liquid-fueled Atlas and Titan obsolete.
The Sputnik moment which led to creation of ARPA:
Back on the ground, the event spurred a mobilization of American scientists unseen since the war. Six weeks after the launch of Sputnik, President Dwight Eisenhower revived the President’s Scientific Advisory Council (PSAC). It was a group of 16 scientists who reported directly to him, granting them an unprecedented amount of influence and power. Twelve weeks after Sputnik, the Department of Defense launched the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA), which was later responsible for the development of the internet. Fifteen months after Sputnik, the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (ODDRE) was launched to oversee all defense research. A 36-year-old physicist who worked on the Manhattan Project, Herb York, was named head of the Office of the ODDRE. There, he reported directly to the president and was given total authority over all defense research spending.
On promoting civilian use of nuclear power:
In 1952, Heinz Haber became associate physicist at UCLA; in the 1950s, Haber eventually became the chief scientific consultant to Walt Disney productions. He later co-hosted Disney’s Man in Space with von Braun. When the Eisenhower administration asked Disney to produce a show championing the civilian use of nuclear power, Heinz Haber was given the assignment. He hosted the Disney broadcast called Our Friend the Atom and wrote a popular children’s book with the same title, both of which explained nuclear fission and fusion in simple terms. General Dynamics, a manufacturer of nuclear reactors, sponsored Our Friend the Atom and the nuclear submarine ride at Disneyland’s Tomorrowland. He is also credited with providing the story for Donald in Mathmagic Land.
Some excerpts from Kill Chain:
It is difficult to overstate the all-encompassing sense of urgency that Washington felt in the early years of the Cold War. The nation had survived the most cataclysmic war in human history only to find itself locked in a long-term strategic competition with a great power that possessed a hostile ideology and a growing nuclear arsenal. There was no “residual overconfidence” in America. If anything, the country was deeply concerned about falling behind in the development of military technology, a fear that became all the more real when the Soviet Union beat the United States into space with the launch of Sputnik in 1957. There was a pervasive belief that America could fail, and that failure could result in another apocalyptic war. That threat had a way of focusing American minds. Nothing would be worse than losing the Cold War, and Eisenhower was prepared to do almost anything to prevent that from happening. In comparison, making massive bets and taking massive risks to develop ambitious new military technologies seemed totally acceptable, even essential, so that is what Eisenhower
The way Eisenhower saw it, Washington’s primary role was to get the big things right. That started with picking the right people—not necessarily good people or nice people, but exceptional people, the kinds of people who might today be called “founders.” Eisenhower believed in empowering these founders by giving them broad authority to solve clearly defined problems, providing them all of the resources and support they needed to be successful, and then holding them strictly accountable for delivering results. In short, it was a strategy of concentration—of priorities, money, effort, and, most importantly, people.
One person Eisenhower bet on was Air Force general Bernard Schriever, a German immigrant who had only recently gotten his first star when the president assigned him the mission of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile that could deliver a nuclear weapon to the other side of the planet in a matter of minutes. 3 This was not even close to being feasible in 1954 when Schriever got to work, but with Eisenhower’s complete support and flush with funding, the general set up shop in an old church in California. He awarded gigantic contracts with fat margins to companies and technologists and integrated them into one military-industrial team.
Eventually, Schriever and his team did the impossible: they developed the Thor, Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman missiles that could deliver nuclear weapons to precise locations on the other side of the planet in minutes. They laid the technological foundation from which America first went to space and then the moon. And they did it all, from start to finish, in just five years.
Schriever was not a singular success. To the contrary, he was one of many founders who developed seemingly impossible military technologies in the early Cold War. Edward Teller, a Hungarian refugee who had worked for Robert Oppenheimer—the founder of the atomic bomb—built the world’s first hydrogen bomb. Admiral Hyman Rickover, a crotchety little man who would never make it past captain in today’s Navy, overcame opposition in his own service in his quest to miniaturize a nuclear reactor that could fit into a submarine and power its operations for years deep underwater. Kelly Johnson, the hard-charging head of Lockheed’s Skunkworks, developed, among many other aircraft, the SR-71 Blackbird, which flew so fast that it could outrun any missile shot at it. The SR-71 is still the fastest manned aircraft, and Johnson designed it with pencils and a slide rule. There were other defense founders as well, and in a matter of years, they built technology that sustained the United States through the Cold War.
This was how America acted when it was serious. The paramount concern was picking winners: the priorities that were more important than anything else, the people who could succeed where others could not, and the industrialists who could quickly build amazing technology that worked. Other concerns, such as fairness and efficiency, were of secondary importance. Did this approach occasionally result in waste, fraud, and abuse? Yes. But that was deemed the price of moving fast, getting things done, and staying ahead of the Soviet Union.
A sprawling bureaucracy materialized in the 1960s to administer and discipline the military-industrial complex. Eisenhower’s more personalized approach to military acquisition and innovation, which was based on picking winners and holding them accountable, became bureaucratized amid the broader adoption of the industrial age management practices that had come into vogue in leading companies.
